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Poor, Relatively Speaking1
Introduction
When on the 6th of January 1941, amidst the roar of the guns of
the second world war, President Roosevelt announced that "in
the future days.., we look forward to a world founded upon four
essential freedoms", including "freedom from want", he was
voicing what was soon to become one of the major themes of the
post-war era. While the elimination of poverty all over the world
had become a much-discussed ir/ternational issue, it was in the
richer countries that an immediate eradication seemed possible.
That battle was joined soon enough after the war in those affluent
countries and the ending of poverty had been a major issue in
their policy discussions.
There are, however, great uncertainties about the appropriate
way of conceptualising poverty in the richer countries. Should
the focus be on absolute poverty or relative poverty? Should
poverty be estimated with a cut-offline that reflects either a level
below which people are absolutely impoverished, or a level that
reflects standards of living common to that country in particular?
These questions are in some ways very easy to answer and indeed
a consensus seems to have emerged in favour of taking a
"relative" view of poverty in the rich countries. Wilfred
Beckerman and Stephen Clark put it this way in their important
recent study on poverty and social security in Britain since 1961:
"we have measured poverty in terms of a ’relative’ poverty line,
which is generally accepted as being the relevant concept for
advanced countries."2
lI am most grateful to Wilfred Beckerman, Theo Cooper, Kieran A. Kennedy, Peter
Townsend and Dorothy Wedderburn, for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
2Beckerman W., and S. Clark, 1982. Poverty and Social Security in Britain Since 1961, Oxford:
University Press, p.20.
There is indeed much merit in this relative view. Especially
against the simplistic absolute conceptualisation of poverty, the
relative view has represented an entirely welcome change.
However, I shall argue that ultimately poverty must be seen to be
primarily an absolute notion, even though the specification of the
absolute levels has to be done quite differently from the way it
used to be done in the older tradition. More importantly, the
contrast between the absolute and the relative features has often
been confused, and ! shall argue that a more general question
about ascertaining the absolute standard of living lies at the root
of the difficulty.
That is going to be my main theme, but before I get to that I
ought to make clear the sense in which i believe the focus on
relative poverty has been appropriate and valuable in the recent
discussions on poverty. In the post-war years there was a
premature optimism about the elimination of poverty in rich
countries based on calculations using poverty lines derived from
nutritional and other requirements of the kind used by Seebohm
Rowntree in his famous poverty studies of York in 1899 and 1936,
or by Charles Booth in his nineteenth century study of poverty in
London. The post-war estimates using these given standards
yielded a very comforting picture of the way things had improved
over the years and indeed in terms of old standards, the picture
certainly looked greatly more favourable than in the darker pre-
war days. For example, the third York survey of 1951, following
Rowntree’s earlier ones, indicated that using the same standard,
the proportion of working class population in poverty appeared
to have had fallen from 31 per cent at the time of the last survey in
1936 to less than 3 per cent in’the new survey of 1951.3 This was
partly the result of general economic growth and a high level of
employment, but also the consequence of various welfare
legislations following the Beveridge Report of 1942, covering
family allowances, national insurance, national assistance and
national health service. Deducting public transfers would have
made the poverty ratio higher than 22 per cent rather than less
than 3 per cent. The changed situation -- despite some statistical
problems -- was indeed genuine, but it was much too slender a
3B. Seebohm Rowntree and G. R. Lavers, 1951. Poverty and the Welfare State, London:
Longmans, p. 40.
basis on which to declare victory in the war against poverty.
While the Labour government did go to the electorate in 1950
with the emphatic claim in its Manifesto that "destitution has
been banished", and that the government had "ensured full
employment and fair shares of the necessities of life",4 there was
little real reason to be smug about eradication of poverty in
Britain. There were lots of people who were in misery and clearly
deprived of what they saw (as I shall presently argue, rightly) as
necessities of life; and the battle against poverty was far from over.
It is in this context that the change of emphasis in the academic
literature from an absolutist to a relativist notion of poverty took
place and it had the immediate effect of debunking the smug
claims based on inadequate absolute standards. But instead of the
attack taking the form of disputing the claim that the old absolute
standards were relevant still, it took the investigation entirely in
the relativist direction and there it has remained through these
years. The relativist response to the smugness was effective and
important. Using a poverty line fixed at a level 40 per cent higher
than the basic national assistance scale, plus rent, Peter
Townsend showed that as many as one in seven Britons were in
poverty in 1960.5 Other important questions were also raised,6
and more detailed and comprehensive estimates soon followed,7
and the poverty battle was seen as wide open. Wl~ile I shall
question the conceptualisation underlying this change, I
certainly would not dispute the value of the relativist
contribution in opening up the question of how poverty lines
should be determined, as well as in preventing a premature
declaration of victory by the old absolutist school.
A Thorough-going Relativity?
Peter Townsend, who -- along with other authors such as
Garry Runciman -- has made pioneering and far-reaching
contributions to the relativist view of poverty puts the case thus:
4Quoted in David Bull, (ed) 1971, Family Poverty London: Duekworth, p.13.
STownsend P., 1962."The Meaning of Poverty", British Journal of Sociology, 8.
6See Wedderburn D. 1962. "Poverty in Britain Today -- The Evidence", Sociological
Review, 10.
7See especially Abel-Smith B. and P.Townsend 1965. The Poorandthe Poorest, London: Bell;
Atkinson A. B. 1970. Poverty in Britain and the Reform of Social Security, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Any rigorous conceptualisation of the social determination of need
dissolves the idea of ’absolute’ need. And a thorough-going relatively
appliesto time as well as place. The necessities of life are not fixed. They
are continuously being adapted and augmented as changes take place in a
society and in its products. Increasing stratification and a developing
division of labour, as well as the growth of powerful new organisations,
create, as well as reconstitute, ’need’. Certainly no standard of sufficiency
could be revised only to take account of changes in prices, for that would
ignore changes in the goods and services consumed as well as new
obligations and expectations placed on members of the community.
Lacking an alternative criterion, the best assumption would be to relate
suffciency to the average rise (or faU) in real incomes. ~
The last remark -- that the best assumption would be to relate
sufficiency to "the average rise (or fall) in real incomes" -- is of
course ad hoc, but the more general argument is undoubtedly
quite persuasive. However, I think this line of reasoning suffers
from two quite general defects. First, absoluteness of needs is not the
same thing as their fixity over time. The relativist approach sees
deprivation in terms of a person or a household being able to
achieve less than what others in that society do, and this relativeness
is not to be confused with variation over time. So the fact that "the
necessities of life are not fixed" is neither here nor there, as far as
the competing claims of the absolutist and relativist views are
concerned. Even under an absolutist approach, the poverty line
will be a function of some variables and there is no apriori reason
why these variables might n0t’change over time.
The second problem is perhaps a more difficult one to sort
out. There is a difference between achieving relatively less than others
and achieving absolutely less because of faUing behind others. This
general distinction, which I think is quite crucial to this debate,
can be illustrated with a different type of interdependence
altogether -- that discussed by Fred Hirsch in analysing "posi-
tional goods".9 Your ability to enjoy an uncrowded beach may
8Townsend p. 1979. "The Development of Research on Poverty", in Department of
Health and Social Security, SocialSecurityResearch: TheDefinitionandMeasurement of Poverty,
London: HMSO, pp. 17-18. See also Townsend, 1979, Poverty in the United Kingdom,
London: Allen Lane and Penguin Books.
9Hirsch F. 1976.Social Limits to Growth, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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depend on your knowing about that beach when others do not, so
that the absolute advantage you will enjoy -- being on an
uncrowded beach -- will depend on your relative position,
knowing something that others do not. You want to have that
information, but this is not because you particularly want to do
relatively better than or as well as others, but you want to do absolutely
well and that in this case requires that you must have some
differential advantage in information. So your absolute
achievement -- not merely your relative success -- may depend
on your relative position in some other space. In examining the
absolutist versus the relativist approach it is important to be clear
about the space we are talking about. Lumping together needs,
commodities, etc., does not help to discriminate between the
different approaches and one of the items in our agenda today has
to be a closer examination of the relationship between these
different spaces.
Before I come to that, let me consider another presentation of
the relativist view -- this one occurring in the important study of
"poverty and progress in Britain" between 1953 and 1973 by
Feigehen, Lansley and Smith. They put the question th~s:
In part the renewed concern with ,’want" reflected generally increased
prosperity and the feeling that the standard of living which society
guaranteed should be raised accordingly. This led to ’relative’ concepts of
poverty, by which the extent of poverty is judged not by some absolute
historically defined standard of living, but in relation to contemporary
standards. By such a moving criterion poverty is obviously more likely to
persist, since there will always be certain sections of society that are badly
off in the sense that they receive below-average incomes. Thus renewed
interest in poverty stemmed to a considerable extent from a recognition
that it is incumbent on society to assist the relatively deprived, lo
One consequence of taking this type of purely relativist view--
going well beyond Townsend’s broader approachal -- is that
l°Fiegehen G. C., P. S. Lanslev and A. D. Smith 1977. Poverty and Progress in Britain
1953-73, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 2-3.
11Even when Peter Townsend chooses "to relate sufficiency to the average rise (or fall) in
real incomes", as in the passage quoted earlier, he does it as a praetieal compromise,
"lacking on alternative criterion". The thesis of "relative deprivation" is different from
and much richer than relying just on relative income levels. See particularly Chapter 6 of
Townsend’s Poverty in the UnitedKingdom. The connection of Townsend’s concept of relative
deprivation to the notion of"capabilities" is discussed below in section 6.
poverty cannot, simply cannot, be eliminated and an anti-
poverty programme can never really be quite successful. As
Fiegehen, Lansley and Smith note, there will always be certain
sections of society that are badly off in relative terms. That
Particular feature can be changed if the relative approach is
differently characterized, e.g. checking the number below 60 per
cent of median income (the answer can be zero). But it remains
difficult to judge, in any purely relative view, how successful an
anti-poverty programme is and to rank the relative merits of
different strategies, since gains shared by all tend to get
discounted. It also has the implication that a general decline in
prosperity with lots of additional people in misery -- say, due to a
severe recession oi" depression -- need not show up as a sharp
increase in poverty since the relative picture need not change. It is
clear that somewhere in the process of refining the concept of
poverty from what is viewed as the crudities of Charles Booth’s or
Seebohm Rowntree’s old-fashioned criteria, we have been made
to abandon here an essential characteristic of poverty, replacing
it with some imperfect representation of inequality as such.
That poverty should in fact be viewed straightforwardly as an
issue of inequality has, in fact, been argued by several authors.
The American sociologists Miller and Roby have put their
position thus;
Casting the issue of poverty in terms of stratification leads to regarding
poverty as an issue of inequality. In this approach, we move away from
efforts to measure poverty lines with pseudo-scientific accuracy. Instead,
we look at the nature and size of the differences between the bottom 20 or
10 per cent and the rest of the society, lz
I have tried to argue elsewhere13 that this view is based on a
confusion. A sharp fall in general prosperity causing widespread
starvation and hardship must be seen by any acceptable criterion
of poverty as an intensificaiton of poverty. But the stated view of
poverty "as an issue of inequality" can easily miss this if the relative
distribution is unchanged and there is no change in "the
l~Miller S. M. and P. Roby, 1971. "Poverty: Changing Social Stratification", in P.
Townsend, (ed), The Concept of Poverty, London: Heinemann, p. 143. See also Miller, S. M.
M. Rein, P. Roby and B. Cross 1967. "Poverty Inequality and Conflict", Annals of the
American Academy of Political Science.
J3Sen A. K., 1981. Poverty and Famine: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, Oxford:
Glaredon Press, Ghapter 2.
differences between the bottom 20 per cent or 10 per cent and the
rest of the society". For example, recognising starvation as
poverty is scarcely a matter of"pseudo-scientific accuracy"!
It can, however, be argued that such sharp declines are most
unlikely in rich countries and we can forget those possibilities. But
that empirical point does nothing to preserve the basic adequacy
of a conceptualisation of poverty which should be able to deal
with a wide variety of counter-factual circumstances. Further-
more, it is not clear that such declines cannot really take place in
rich countries. A measure of poverty should have been able to
reflect the Dutch "hunger winter’’x4 of 1944-45, when
widespread starvation was acute. And it must not fail to notice the
collapse that would surely visit Britain if Mrs. Thatcher’s quest
for a "leaner and fitter" British economy goes on much longer.
The tendency of many of these measures to look plausible in
situations of growth, ignoring the possibility of contraction,
betrayed the timing of the birth of these measures in the balmy
sixties, when the only possible direction seemed forward.
The Policy Definition
While one could easily reject a fully relativised view of poverty,
making poverty just "an issue of inequality", it is possible to adopt
a primarily relativised view without running into quite the same
problems. The poverty line that has been most commonly used in
recent studies of British poverty is the one given by the official
Supplementary Benefit scale,15 and this scale has been con-
sistently revised with attention being paid to the average level of
British income. In fact, the scale has been revised upwards faster
than the average income growth, and the poverty line in real
terms did in fact double between July 1948 and November
1975.16 Using this poverty line, adjusted for cost-of-living
14This famine was indeed spread very widely across the Dutch population, thereby
making the relative extents of deprivation quite muddled; see Aykroyd W.R. 1974. The
Conquest of Famine London: Chatto and Windus; Stein Z., M. Susser, G. Saenger and F.
Marolla 1975. Famine and Human Development: The Dutch Hunger Winter of1944- 45 London:
Oxford University Press.
15See for example, Atkinson A. B., 1970. Poverty in Britain and the Reform of Social Security; D.
Bull, (ed), Family Poverty; Fiegehen, Lansley and Smith, Poverty and Progress in Britain
1953-73; R. Berthoud and J. C. Brown with S. Cooper, 1981. Poverty and the Development of
Anti-Poverty Policy in the UK, London: Heinemann; W. Beckerman and S.Clark, Povertyand
Social Security in Britain Since 1961.
16Beckerman and Clark, p.4.
changes on a month to month basis, Wilfred Beckerman and
Stephen Clark have estimated that the number of persons in
poverty in Britain went up by about 59 per cent between 1961-63
and 1974--76.17 This rise is not entirely due to the upward
revision of the poverty line, another important factor is the
demographic change associated with an increase in the number
of pensioners in the British population, but the upward trend of
the poverty line is certainly a major influence in this direction.18
This practice of using the Supplementary Benefit scale as the
poverty line is open to some obvious problems of its own. Not the
least of these is the perversity whereby an increase in the attempt
by the State to deal with poverty and low incomes by raising the
Supplementary Benefit scale will tend to increase rather than
diminish the measured level of poverty by raising the poverty
line. In this view, helping more is read as more help being needed.
The most effective strategy for the government to adopt to reduce
the number of the "poor", under this approach, is to cut, rather
than raise, the level of assistance through Supplementary
Benefits. This can scaracely be right.
Identifying the poverty line with the Supplementary Benefit
scale belongs to a more general tradition which the United States
President’s Commission on Income Maintenance in 1969 called
the "policy definition" of poverty.19 It is a level of income that is
seen as something "the society feels some responsibility for
providing to all persons". This approach too is, I believe,
fundamentally flawed,z° The problem is that the level of benefits
is determined by a variety of considerations going well beyond
reflecting the cut-off point of identified poverty. For one thing, it
reflects what is feasible. But the fact that the elimination of some
specific deprivation w even of starvation -- might be seen, given
particular circumstances
, 
as unfeasible, does not change the fact
JTBeckerman and Clark, p.3.
lSBeckerman and Clark, pp.3-4. A very bigfactor in thlsincrease in the Beckerman-Clark
calculation is their procedure ofadjustingthe poverty line for cost-of-livingincrease every
month in between the official adjustments of the Supplementary Benefit scale, so that
those whose incomes were raised exactly to the Suplementary Benefit level through that
scheme would shortly appear as beingbelow the Beckerman-Clark poverty line as a result
ofthe monthly adjustments.
JgU.S. President’s Commission on Income Maintenance 1969. Poverty Amid Plenty,
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, p. 8.
Z°Sew A. K. 1981 opcit, pp. 17-21.
of that deprivation. Inescapable poverty is still poverty. Further-
more, the decisions regarding State assistance will -- aside from
feasibility considerations -- reflect other pressures, e.g. pulls and
pushes of politically important groups and policy objectives other
than poverty removal (such as reduction of inequality). Attempts
to read the poverty line from the assistance level are riddled with
pitfalls. If Mrs. Thatcher decides today that the country cannot
afford the present level of Supplementary Benefits and the scale
must be cut, that decision in itself will not reduce poverty in
Britain, (through lowering the poverty line below which people
count as poor).
The Absolutist Core
Neither the thoroughgoing relativist view of seeing poverty as
"an issue in inequality", nor using the so-called "policy defini-
tion", can therefore serve as an adequate theoretical basis for
conceptualising poverty. There is, I would argue, an irreducible
absolutist core in the idea of poverty. One element of that
absolutist core is obvious enough, though the modern literature
on the subject often does its best to ignore it. If there is starvation
and hunger, then -- no matter what the relative picture looks like
if relevant -- has to take a back seat behind the possibly
dominating absolutist consideration. While it might be thought
that this type of poverty -- involving malnutrition or hunger --
is simply irrelevant to the richer countries, that is empirically far
from clear, even though the frequency of this type of deprivation
is certainly much less in these countries.
Even when we shift our attention from hunger and look at other
aspects of living standard, the absolutist aspect of poverty does
not disappear. The fact that some people have a lower standard of
living than others is certainly proof cd" inequality, but by itself it
cannot be a proof of poverty unless we know something more
about the standard of living that these people do in fact enjoy. It
would be absurd to call someone poor just because he had the
means to buy only one Cadillac a day when others in that
community could buy two of these cars each day. The absolute
considerations cannot be inconsequential for conceptualising
poverty.
The temptation to think of poverty as beingaltogether relative
arises partly from the fact that the absolute satisfaction of some of
9
the needs might depend on a person’s relative position vis-a-vis
others in much the same way as -- in the case discussed earlier --
the absolute advantage of a person to enjoya lonely beach may
depend upon his relative advantage in the space of knowledge
regarding the existence and access to such beaches. The point was
very well caught by Adam Smith when he was discussing the
concept of necessaries in The Wealth of Nations:
By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are
indispensibly necessary for the support of life, but whatever the custom of
the country renders it indecent for creditab le people, even the lowest order,
to be without... Custom... has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life
in England. The poorest creditable person o f either sex would be ashamed
to appear in public without them. zl
In this view to be able to avoid shame, an eighteenth century
Englishman has to have leather shoes. It may be true that this
situation has come to pass precisely because the typical members
of that community happen to possess leather shoes, but the person
xn question needs leather shoes not so much to be less ashamed than
others -- that relative question is not even posed by-Adam Smith
-- but simply not to be ashamed, which as an achievement is an
absolute one.
Capabilities Contrasted with Commodities, Characteristics and Utilities
At this stage of this discussion I would like to take up a
somewhat more general question, viz., that of the right focus for
assessing standard of living. In my Tanner Lecture22 given at
Stanford University in 1979 and my Hennipman Lectures, given
earlier this year at Amsterdam,z3 I have tried to argue that the
right focus is neither commodities, nor characteristics (in the
sense of Gorman and Lancaster), nor utility, but something that
may be called a person’s capability. The contrasts may be
brought out by an illustration. Take a bicycle. It is, of course, a
commodity. It has several characteristics, and let us concentrate
25Smith Adam 1776. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Everyman
Edition, London: Home University Library, pp. 351-2.
22Sen A. K. 1980. "Equality of What?" inS.McMurrln, (ed), The TannerLecturesonHuman
Values, Cambridge: Cambridge University Pre~, reprinted in A. K.Sen, 1982 (a) Choice,
Welfare and Measurement Oxford, Blaekwell and Cambridge, Mass: MIT. Press, in which
volume see also "Introduction", pp. 30-1.
23Sen A.K. 1982 (b) "The Standard of Living", to be published by North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
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on one particular characteristic, viz., transportation. Having a
bike gives a person the ability to move about in a certain way that
he may not be able to do without the bike. So the transportation
characteristic of the bike gives the person the capability of moving in
a certain way.That capability may give the person utility or
happiness if he seeks such movement or finds it pleasurable. So
there is, as it were, a sequence from a commodity (in this case a
bike), to characteristics (in this case, transportation), to capa-
bility to function (in this case, the ability to move), to utility (in
this case, pleasure from moving).
It can be argued that it is the third category-- that of capability
to function -- that comes closest to the notion of standard of
living. The commodity ownership or availability itself is not the
right focus since it does not tell us what the person can, in fact, do.
I may not be able to use the bike if- say m I happen to be
handicapped. Having the bike -- or something else with that
characteristic -- may provide the basis for a contribution to the
standard of living, but it is not in itselfa constitutent part of that
standard. On the other hand, utility reflects the use of the bike,
but does not concentrate on the use itself, but on the mental
reaction to that use. IfI am of a cheerful disposition and enjoy life
even without being able to move around, because I succeed in
having my heart leap up-every time I behold a rainbow in the sky,
I am no doubt a happy person, but it does not follow that I have a
high standard of living. A grumbling rich man may well be less
happy than a contented peasant; the comparison of standard of
living is not a comparison of utilities. So the constitutent part of
the standard of living is not the good, nor its characteristics, but
the ability to do various things by using that good or those
characteristics and it is that ability rather than the mental
reaction to that abilty in the form of happiness that, in this view,
reflects the standard of living.
Absolute Capabilities and Relative Commodity Requirements
If this thesis of the capabilty focus of standard of living is
accepted (and I believe the case for it is quite strong), then several
other things follow. One of them happens to be some sorting out of
the absolute-relative disputation in the conceptualisation of
poverty. At the risk of oversimplification, I would like to say that
poverty is an absolute notion in the space of capabilities, but very
often it will take a relative form in the space of commodities or
characteristics.
Let us return to Adam Smith. The capability to which he was
referring was the one ofavoidi’ng shame. The commodity that you
needed for it, in the particular illustration he considered,
happened to be a pair of leather shoes. As we consider richer and
richer communities, the commodity requirement of the same
capability -- avoiding shame -- increases. As Adam Smith
noted, "the Greeks and ’Romans lived ... very comfortably
though they had no linen," but "in the present time, through the
greater part of Europe, a creditable day-labourer would be
ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt",z4 In the
commodity space, therefore, escape from poverty in the form of
avoiding shame requires a varying collection of commodities and
it is this collection and the resources needed for it that happen to
be relative vis-a-vis the situations of others. But on the space of the
capabilities themselves-- the direct constituent of the standard of
living-- escape from poverty has an absolute requirement, to wit,
avoidance of shame. Not so much having equal shame as others,
but just not being ashamed, absolutely.
If we view the problem ofconceptualising poverty in this light,
then there is no conflict between the irreducible absolutist
element in thenotion of poverty (related to capabilities and the
standard of living) and the "thoroughgoing relativity" to which
Peter Townsend refers, if the latter is interpreted as applying to
commodities and resources. If Townsend puts his finger wrong,
this happens when he points towards the untenability of the idea
of absolute needs. Of course, needs too can vary between one
society and another, but the cases that are typically discussed in
this context involve a different bundle of commodities and a
higher real value Of resources fulfilling the same needs. When
Townsend estimates the resources required for being able to
"participate in the activities of the community", he is in fact
estimating the varying resource requirements of fulfilling the
same absolute need.
In a poor community the resources or commodities needed to
participate in the standard activities of the community might be
very little indeed. In such a community the perception of poverty
~*Smith Adam, 1776, op.cit, pp.351-2.
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is primarily concerned with the commodity requirements of
fulfilling nutritional needs and perhaps some needs of being
clothed, sheltered and free from disease¯ This is the world of
Charles Booth or Seebohm Rowntree in nineteenth century or
early twentieth century London or York and that of poverty
estimation today, say, in India. The more physical needs tend to
dominate over the needs of communal participation, on which
Townsend focuses, at this less affluent stage both because the
nutritional and other physical needs would tend to have a more
prominent place in the standard-of-living estimation and also
because the requirement of participation are rather easily
fulfilled. For a richer community, however, the nutritional and
other physical requirements (such as clothing as protection from
climatic conditions) are typically already met and the needs of
communal participation -- while absolutely no different in the
space of capabilities -- will have a much higher demand in the
space of commodities and that of resources. Relative deprivation,
in this case, is nothing other than a relative failure in the
commodity space -- or resource space -- having the effect of an
absolute deprivation in the capability space.
The varying commodity requirements of meeting the same
absolute need applies not merely to avoiding shame (following
Adam Smith) and being able to participate in the activities of the
comunity (following Peter Townsend), but also to a number of
other needs. It has been pointed out by Theo Cooper in a
regrettably, unpublished paper,25 that in West Europe or North
¯
~- . ,
Amerma a child might not be able to follow his school programme
unless the child happens to have access to a television¯ If this is in
fact the case, then the child without a television in Britain or in
Ireland would be clearly worse off-- have a lower standard of
living -- in this respect than a child, say, in Tanzania without a
television. It is not so much that the British or the Irish child has a
brand new need, but that to meet the same need as the Tanzanian
child -- the need to be educated -- the British or the Irish child
must have more commodities¯ Of course, the British child might
fulfill the need better than the Tanzanian with the help of the
television m I am not expressing a view on this -- but the fact
remains that the television is a necessity for the British child for
school education in a way it is not for the Tanzanian child.
2SCooper T. C. 1971. "Poverty", unpublished note, St. Hugh’s College, Oxford.
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Similarly, in a society in which most families own cars, public
transport services might be poor, so that a carless family in such a
society might be absolutely-poor in a way it might not have been in a
poorer society. To take another example, widespread ownership
of refrigerators and freezers in a community might affect the
structure of food retailing, thereby making it more difficult in
such a society to make do without having these facilities oneself.
It is, of course, not my point that there is no difference in the
standards of living of rich and poor countries. There are
enormous differences in the fulfilment of some of the most basic
capabilities, e.g., to meet nutritional requirements, to escape
avoidable disease, to be sheltered, to be clothed, to be able to
travel and to be educated. But whereas the commodity
requirements of some of these capability fulfilments are not
tremendously variable between one community and another,
such variability is enormous in the case of other capabilities. The
capability to live without shame emphasized by Adam Smith,
that of being able to participate in the activities of the community
discussed by Peter Townsend and that of having self-respect
discussed by John Rawls,z6 are examples of capabilities with
extremely variable resource requirements.~7 And as it happens
the resource requirements typically go up in these cases with the
average prosperity of the nation, so that the relativist view
acquires plausibility despite the absolutist basis of the concept of
poverity in terms of capabilities and deprivation.
It is perhaps worth remarking that this type of derived relativism
does not run into the difficulties noted earlier with thoroughgoing
relativity of the kind associated with seeing poverty as "an issue of
inequality". When the Dutch in the hunger winter of 1944-45
found themselves suddenly in much reduced circumstances, their
commodity requirements of capability fulfilments did not go
down immediately to reduce the bite of poverty, as under the
purely relativist account. While the commodity requirements are
sensitive to the opulence and the affluence of the community in
general, this relationship is neither one of instant adjustment, nor
~SRawls J. 1971. A theory ofoTuslice, Cambridge, Mass.: Havard University Press,
pp. 440--6.
27Educa tlon is perhaps an immediate case, where the resource variability isimportant but
perhaps not as extreme as with some of these other capabilities related to social
psychology.
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is it a straightforward one to be captured simply by looking at the
average income or even the current Lorenz curve of income
distribution. Response to communal standards is a more complex
process than that.
Primary Goods and Varying Requirements Between and Within
Communities
I should also remark on a point of some general philosophical
interest related to this way of viewing personal advantage and
social poverty. The philosophical underpinning of the recent
poverty literature has been helped enormously by John Rawls’
far-reaching analysis of social justice. One respect in which Rawls
differs sharply from the utility-based theories, e.g.,
utilitarianism, is his focus on what he calls "primary goods"
rather than on utility in judging a person’s advantage. Our focus
on capability differs both from the utilitarian concern with just
mental reactions and from the Rawlsian concern with primary
goods as such, though the approach of capabilities is much
influenced by Rawls’ moral analysis. Making comparisons in the
capability space is quite different from doing that either in the
utility space (as done by utilitarians), or in the space of
commodities or primary goods(even when this is done very
broadly, as Rawls does). In this view the variables to focus on
consist of such factors as meeting nutritional requirements rather
than either the pleasure from meeting those requirements (as
under utilitarianism), or the income or food needed to meet those
requirements (as in the Rawlsian approach). Similarly, the
capability approach focuses on meeting the need of self-respect
rather than either the pleasure from having self-respect, or what
Rawls calls "the social basis of self respect",z8 The capability
approach differs from the traditional utility-based analysis ~/s
strongly as the Rawlsian approach does, but it continues to
concentrate on human beings -- their capabilties in this case --
rather than moving with Rawls to incomes, goods and
2aRawlsJ. 1971 op cit. pp. 605. Note, however, that Rawls facilitates between taking "the
bases of self-respect" as a primary good (this is consistent with taking income as a primary
good) and referring to "self-respect" itself as a primary good, which is closer to oureoncern
with capabilities.
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characteristics.29 Rawls himself motivated his focus on primary
goods, using arguments that rely on the importance of
capabilities. What the capability approach does is to make that
basis explicit and then it goes on to acknowledge the enormous
variability that exists in the commodity requirements of
capability fulfilment. In this sense, the capability approach can
be seen as one possible extension of the Rawlsian perspective.
The extension makes a substantial practical difference not
merely because the commodity requirements of capabilty
fulfilment vary between one community and another, or one
’country and another, but also because there are differences within
a given country or community in the mapping from commodities
to capabilities. In a country with various racial groups, even the
food requirements of nutritional fulfilment may vary a great deal
from one group to another.30 For example, in India the people in
the state of Kerala have both the lowest level of average calorie
intake in the country as wel! as the highest level of longevity (and
general health); and while part of the difference is certainly due to
distributional considerations and the availability of back-up
medical services, the physiological differences in the calorie
requirements of the Malayali in Kerala compared with, say, the
larger Punjabi, is also a factor.
This type ofintra-country orintra-community difference can be
very important even in rich countries and even those with a
basically homogeneous population. This is because of other
variations, e.g., that of age. Of particular relevance in this context
is the fact that a high proportion of those who are recognised as
poor in the richer countries are also old or disabled in some way.a
Inability to earn an adequate income often reflects a physical
disadvantage of some kind, and this disadvantage is not
irrevelant to the conversion of goods into capabilities.
While the nutritional requirements may not increase with age
29I have discussed this contrast more extensively in Sen A.K. 1980 op. cit. and also in
"Introduction" to Sen A.K. 1982(a). See also John Rawls 1982, "Social Unity and
Primary Goods", in A. K. Sen and B. Williams, (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 168-9.
a°This is in addition to inter-individual and inter-temporal variations emphasised by
Sukhatme, Sfinivasan and others.
a I See Dorothy Wedderburn 1961. The Aged in the Welfare State, London: Bell, and A. B.
Atkinson 1970 Op. cit.
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or disability -- may even decrease somewhat -- the resource
requirements of, say, movement, or of participation in the
activities of the community, may be considerably larger for older
or disabled people.The focus on absolute capabilities brings out
the importance of these intra-community variations in the
commodity space, going well beyond the inter-community
variations emphasized in the typical relativist literature.
While it might not be easy to take full note of such intra-
community variations in practical studies of poverty, it is
important to have conceptual clarity on this question and to seek
more sensitive practical measures in the long run. I should think
the direction in which to go would be that of some kind of an
efficiency-adjusted level of income with "income" units
reflecting command over capabilities rather than over com-
modities. This will be, I do not doubt, quite, a rewarding field of
research.
Aggregative Poverty Measures and Relativities
Even when incomes are not thus adjusted within a given
country or community, conceptualisation of poverty does, of
course, involve more than just fixing a poverty line. I have so far
said nothing at all on that question, and I should now briefly turn
to it. The predicaments of people below the poverty line are not
by any means homogeneous even when their respective abilities
to convert commodities into capabilities are identical, since they
differ from each other in the size of their respective shortfalls
of income from the poverty line. Traditionally, poverty
measurement has tried to make do with operating on two
aggregate magnitudes, viz. the head-count ratio (i.e., the
proportion of population below the poverty line) and the income-
gap ratio (i.e., the average income shortfall of all the poor taken
together as a proportion of the poverty line itself, or alternatively
as a proportion of the mean income of the community). But it is
easy to show that these two magnitudes taken together cannot
capture poverty adequately since any sensible measure of poverty
must be sensitive also to the distribution of that income shortfall
among the poor. Bearing this in mind, several of us in recent years
have tried to propose various distribution-sensitive measures of
poverty.
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The one I proposed in Econometrica of 197632 is based on an
axiomatic structure that gets numerical weights from ordinal
information regarding relative incomes much in the same way as
Borda -- in his theory of voting m obtained his rank-order
method by converting ranks into weights. With such an
axiomatisation and a chosen procedure of normalisation, it can
be shown that one gets a measure of poverty P that depends on
three parameters, viz., the head-count ratio H, the income-gap
ratio I as a proportion of the poverty line and the Gini coefficient
G of the distribution of income among the poor:
P= H[I+ (1 - I)O].
Evidently, this measure P can be expressed as a function of the
head-count ratio H, the poverty line ~-, and the equally
distributed equivalent income eg of the poor, as defined by Kolm
and Atkinson,33 using the Gini social evaluation function.34
P = H(Tr - eg)/71"
A generalisation of this measure, proposed by B|ackorby and
Donaldson,35 replaces the equally distributed equivalent income
eg based on the specific Gini social evaluation function by any
member e of equally distributed equivalent incomes for a whole
class of such social evaluation functions:
P = H( ,r- e)/Ir
Other variations have also been proposed by such authors as
Kakwani; Takayama; Hamada and Takayama; Anand;
Osmani; Thon; Szal; Fields, Pyatt; Clark, Hemming and Ulph;
Foster; Foster, Greer and Thorbecke; Chakravarty; and others.36
32Sen, A. K. 1976. "Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement", Econometrica, 44.
An earlier version, with some variations, was presented in A. K. Sen, 1973. "Poverty,
Inequality and Unemployment: Some Conceptual Issues in Measurement", Economicand
Political Weekly, 8.
33Kolm S. C. 1969. "The Optimal Production of Social Justice", inJ. Margolis and H.
Guitton, eds., Public Economics, London: Macmillan. Atkinson, A. B. 1970. "On the
measurement of Inequallty" ~ournal of Economic Theory, 2.
34The Gini social evaluation function is presented and axiomatised in A. K.Sen, 1974.
"Informational Bases of Alternative Welfare Approaches: Aggregation and Income
Distribution", oToumal of Public Economics, 4. This is extended to the multicommodity ease
in A. K. Sen, 1976. "Real National Income", Review of Economic Studies, 43. See also P.J.
Hammond, 1978."Economlc Welfare with Rank Order Price Weighting", Review of
Economic Studies, 45.
35Blackorby and D.Donaldson 1980. "Ethical Indices for the Measurement of Poverty",
Econometrics, 48.
aaMany ofthese variations are discussed in Sen A. K. 1981 op. cit. Chapter3 and Appendix
C. See also Sen A. K. 1980(a) op. cit. "Introduction" pp.31-6.
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I do not propose to discuss here, I am happy to say, the various
properties of these different variants. But there is one slightly
contrary property that is worth a comment because it links up
with the absolute-relative question with which this lecture has
been concerned. In presenting my measure in Econometrica 1976, I
expressed some support for the view that the poverty measure
must satisfy an adapted version of the so-called Pigou-Dalton
condition of transfer, viz. any transfer of income to a poor person
from a person who is richer must reduce the recorded poverty
level. This axiom was not used in deriving my measure P and
indeed, as I noted the following year in Econometrica, it is possible
for the measure P to violate this Pigou-Daltoncondition, albeit in
rather rare circumstances,a7 It turns out that all the variants of
this measure mentioned above -- with a few exceptions involving
other rather unappealing characteristics -- can also violate the
Piguo-Dalton condition?8 For the violation result to hold it is
necessary
, 
though not sufficient, that the transfer from the rich
person should make him fall from above to below the poverty line
as a consequence of the transfer. Is this violation of the Pigou-
Dalton transfer condition a disturbing characteristic?
The Pigou-Dalton condition is certainly an appealing one as a
requirement of a measure of inequality and this is, indeed, how it
has been used by Kolm and Atkinson and how it has been related
to the property of S-concavity in a paper on economic inequality
by Dasgupta, Starrett and myself. 39 But does this make sense for a
measure of poverty as opposed to inequality? If one takes a
thoroughgoing relativist view, then poverty is nothing other than
"an issue in equality", as Miller and Roby put it and thenclearly
the Pigou-Dalton axiom must be unexceptionable as a restriction
on permissible poverty measures.4° But if the absolutist view is
taken, then the poverty line is not just a reflection of some relative
characteristic of the distributional statistics, but represents a line
with some absolute justification of its own. For example, in the
37Sen A. K. 1977. "Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination", Econometrica, 45, p. 77.
38Sen A. K. 1981. op.cit., Appendix C.
39Dasgupta P., A. K. Sen and D. Starrett, 1973. "Notes on the Measurement of
Inequality", JournalofEconomic Theory, 6. See also M. Rothschild andJ. E. Stiglitz, 1973.
"Some Further Results in the Measurement of Inequality", jTournalofEconomic Theory, 6.
4°This will, of course, not be the ease when there are efficiency differences in converting
resources into capability, as discussed above.
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capability view, the poverty line may represent the level at which
a person can achieve adequate participation in communal
activities (as characterised by Townsend) or be free from public
shame (as discussed by Adam Smith). In this case if a transfer
drags a person from.above to below that threshold while reducing
the income gap of a poorer person, it is not obvious that the overall
poverty measure must invariably be expected to decline. The
poverty line has some absolute significance and to cross it is a
change of some importance. Thus, the absolutist approach to
conceptualising poverty -- even though it involves a relativist
reflection in the commodity space -- will tend to reject the
invariable insistence on the Pigou-Dalton condition of transfer
when such a transfer changes the number of people below the
poverty line.
There is a weaker version of the transfer axiom, which I called
the Weak Transfer Axiom,41 which insists on the Pigou-Dalton
condition being invariably satisfied whenever the transfer to the
poor person from the richer person does not change the number
below the poverty line. This of course is fully consistent with the
absolutist approach and is indeed satisfied by the measure P and
most of its variants.
Concluding Remarks
I end with a few concluding statements. First, I have argued
that, despite the emerging unanimity in favour of taking a
relative as opposed to an absolute view of poverty, there is a good
case for an absolutist approach. Both the purely relative view of
poverty and the policy related view are quite inadequate. In the
latter context, the perversity of using the "policy definition", e.g.,
that given by the number below Supplementary Benefit scale in
Britain, is striking. The dispute on absolute vs. relative
conceptualisation of poverty can be better resolved by being
more explicit on the particular space in which comparisons are to
be made.
Second, I have outlined the case for using an absolute approach
to poverty related to the notion of capability. Capabilities differ
both frm commodities and characteristics, on the one hand and
utilities, on the other. The capability approach shares with John
~J"Soclal Choice Theory: A Re-examination", p. 77; Sen A. K. 1981. op.cit, p. 186.
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Rawls the rejection of the utilitarian obsession with mental
reactions only, but differs from Rawls’ concentration on primary
goods by focusing on capabilities of human beings rather than
characteristics of goods they possess.
Third, an absolute approach in the space of capabilities
translates into a relative approach in the space of commodities,
resources and incomes in dealing with some important
capabilities, such as avoiding shame, participating in social
activities and retaining self-respect. A concern with such absolute
capabilities has implications that are analogous to features of
"relative deprivation", as developed by Peter Townsend and
others.
Fourth, since poverty removal is not the bnly object of social
policy and inequality removal has a status of its own, taking an
absolutist view of poverty must not be confused with being
indifferent to inequality as such. While poverty may be seen as a
failure to reach some absolute level of capability, the issue of
inequality of capabilities is an important one, in its own right, for
public policy.4z
Fifth, while the inter-country and inter-community differ-
ences have been much discussed in the context ofconceptualising
poverty, the differences within a country and within a community
need much more attention because of interpersonal variations in
converting commodities into capabilities. This is particularly
important since poverty is often associated with handicaps due to
disability or age. This problem could perhaps be handled by
using efficiency-income units reflecting command over
capabilities rather than command over goods and services.
Finally, I have argued that the reasonableness of various
axioms that aggregate measures of poverty may or may not be
asked to satisfy depend (sometimes in an unobvious and certainly
unexplored way) on whether fundamentally a relative or an
absolute approach is being adopted. This has practical impli-
cations on the choice of statistical measures to be used. It is
important to know whether the poor, relatively speaking, are in
some deeper sense absolutely deprived. It makes a difference.
42See Sen, A. K. 1980 Op.cit.
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